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FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY*
VIII. RESTRAINTS ON AAIENATION
An investigation of the Kentucky decisions as to future
property interests shows a confusion of the doctrine that property should not be made inalienable and the doctrine that all
interests must arise within a prescribed period. The court in
Commack v. Allen' has helped to clear away the uncertainty
as to the meaning of section 2366 of the Kentucky Statutes and
holds that this section, which forbids restraints on alienation for
a longer period than a life or lives in being, twenty-one years
and ten months, does not apply to restraints on alienation of
vested estates, but to cases and situations where the suspension
of alienation was due to the postponement of the vesting of the
fee in a person who could alienate it, and the court furthermore
holds that the common law rule as to restraints is still in force
in this state with the modification that partial restraints are allowed.
Restraints on alienation, as pointed out by Professor Gray
in his work upon the subject, 2 are of two types, (1) those where
the estate is given on condition that it shall not be alienated or
until it is alienated; that is, subject either to the right of entry
by the grantor for condition broken, or to a limitation which
upon alienation puts an end to the estate without entry; and
(2) those where the holder cannot assign his estate, and any
attempt to do so on his part is a nullity. In the first type of
restraints the estate is liable to forfeiture, but in the second the
attempted conveyance alone is rendered ineffective.
In making a survey of the Kentucky cases dealing with
restraints on alienation it is proposed to follow the plan of
Professor Gray and to consider the subject under these two
heads.

(1)

FoovEiTuuE OF EsTATEs
(a)

On Alienation

In Kentucky as elsewhere a restraint on the alienation gen* The first installments of this article were published in the January, March and May issues of Volume XII of the Kentucky Law
Journal, and in the November and January issues of Volume XIII.
1199 Ky. 268.
2Gray-Restraints on Alienation (2ad Ed.) page 5.
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erally of a fee simple is void.3 In Henning v. HarrisoA the
testator incorporated the following provision in his will: "My
will is that the real estate devised by me to my daughters shall
remain theirs respectively and their heirs as patrimonial estate,
and not subject by them to be sold." It was held that this provision was void. The reason for the court's so holding is well
stated in Harkness v. Lisle.5 "The general rule is that the right
of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality of every
vested fee simple title. To hold that alienation could be restrained during the lifetime of the fee simple holder would be
to deprive the fee of all its essential qualities. As said by Littleton: "If such a condition be good, then the condition should
oust him of all power which the law gives him, which should be
against reason." While bound by the former adjudications of
this court to adhere to the doctrine that a limitation of time is
valid, we have no hesitation in saying that the limitation attempted to be imposed -by the will in question is unreasonable.
A testator cannot devise a fee and then destroy it entirely."
Prom this statement it is seen that in Kentucky the general rule forbidding restraints on alienation in the case of an
estate in fee simple is departed from to the extent that such limitations are permitted provided in the opinion of the court
they are reasonable. This doctrine seems to have had its origin
in the decision of Stewart v. Brady,6 where it was provided in a
devise of land that it should "in no way be disposed of, by deed
or gift or sale by her, until she arrives at the age of thirtyfive years." It was held that this limitation on the use was not
inconsistent with the fee and was therefore valid.
As said in Lawson v. Lightfoot 7 the court has never fixed
a limit to such restraint, but what restraints are reasonable and
what are unreasonable must be determined upon the particular
circumstances of each particular case as it comes before the
court.8 A provision that the grantee should not trade or sell the
S Morton!'s Guardian v. Morton, 120 Ky. 251, 85 S. W. 1188; Robinson v. Gray, 29 Ky. L. L. 1096, 97 S. W. 347; Cain v- Gray, 142 Ky. 402,

142 S. W. 715.
413 Bush 723.
5132 Ky 767, 117 S. W. 264.
' 3 Bush 623.
'27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84 S. W. 789

8 ChappeNl v. Frick, Co., 166 Ky. 311, 179 S. W. 203; Lawson v.
Lightfoot, 84 S. W. 739, 27 Ky. L. R. 217.
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property for twenty years except to the grantor's bodily heirs
was sustained by the court in Francis v. Big Sandy CGmpany-'
A restraint on alienation for twenty years was also held
valid in Price v. Virginia Iron & C. (o.,10 and in Call v. Sheumaker."1 A proviso that land should not be sold until twentyeight years had elapsed after the testator's death was held good
2
in Johnson v. Dumeyer,U
and one to the effect that the devisee
should not alienate until he arrived at the age of twenty-eight
years was sustained in Keen. v. Keen13 and several cases have
held that such a provision forbidding alienation before reaching
the age of thirty-five years was good.' 4 However, where the
limitation is for the lifetime of the grantee or devisee the decisions are numerous that hold such a limitation is inconsistent
with the estate conveyed and is void. 15 An attempt to restrict
alienation,'to the other devisees was held bad in Carpenter v.
Allen.' 6 The court said: "It needs no argument to demonstrate
that substantially the whole power of alienation is taken away
when one can dispose of his property only to certain persons
who may be unable or unwilling to buy, or who, if able and willing to buy, have it in their power to compel the owner to accept
an unfair price for the property."
A clause limiting the right of alienation to any one except
the heirs of the grantor was held equally open to objection in the
case of Clwppell v. Frick Company.17
On the other hand, it is clear from the decisions that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals will sustain a restriction on alienation for the lifetime of the grantor or some other person than
the grantee or devisee, as the wife of the testator.' 8 Such a
'171

Ky. 209, 188 S. W. 345.

10171 Ky. 523, 188 S. W.

658.

-24 Ky. L. R. 686, 69 S. W. 749.
"23 Ky. L. R. 2243.
113
Ky. L. R. 956.
14 Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush 623; Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263,
68 S. W. 131; Smnith v. Isaacs, 78 S. W. 434, 25 Ky. L. R. 1727.
"Morton's Guardian v. Morton, 120 Ky. 251; Harkcness v. Lisle,
132 Ky. 626, 117 S. W. 264; Cropper v. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W.
380; Thurmond v. Thurmond, 190 Ky. 582, 228 S. W. 29.
"198 Ky. 252.
"166 Ky. 311, 179 S. W. 203.
"Lawson v. Lightfoot, 84 S. W. 739, 27 Ky. L. R. 217; Frazier v.
Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 130 S. W. 812; Polly v. Adkins, 145 Ky. 370, 140 S.
W. 551; Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S. W. 247;
Turner v. Lewis, 189 Ky 837, 228 S. W. 367.
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provision, however, was held in Forquer v. Bovard 9 not to prevent the grantee from devising the property by will to his children during the lifetime of the grantor.
The court in Saulsberry v. Saulsberry20 ruled that a.provision in a deed of 1896 stipulating that the land should not be
alienated before 1950 was invalid.
In Highland Realty Company v. Groves21 the court sustained restrictions on the kind of buildings to be erected ox' the.
land, the distance from the street at which houses should be
built and further provisions whereby the grantee bound himself and his heirs "not to sell or rent said property to persons
of African descent nor to permit same to be used for the sale of
malt, spirituous or vinous liquors for a period of fifty years."
The court in the course of its opinion observed: "While such
conditions as impose a restraint upon the free use or alienation
of real estate are looked upon with disfavor by the courts, and
are rather strictly construed, inasmuch as they detract from the
freest use of the fee simple, and are annoying to owners and intervening purchasers, being somewhat at variance, too, with the
system in vogue in this country which regards real estate as an
article of commerce, still they are upheld when not repugnant
to some plain provision of the law and not unreasonable in
themselves."
Since restraints on alienation are held valid in the case
of estates in fee simple provided they are reasonable, it follows
a fortiorithat the Kentucky Court of Appeals holds them lawful
in the case of lesser estates, estates for life and estates for years.
In Holt's Executor v. Deshon2" 2 the court upheld a restraint
as to the enjoyment of a life estate where the devisor provided
that the farm should never be sold, leased or rented and that
no bluegrass field should be plowed. The court in sustaining
a provision that the life tenants should live upon the granted
premises in the case of Baker v. Baker 23 observed that "It is
competent in creating any character of estate, whether absolute
or one for life, to imcumber or impose burdens upon it, and require that its enjoyment by the grantee or devisee shall be sub- 154
2 140
21130
126
191

Ky. 377, 157 S. W. 724.
Ky. 608, 131 S. W. 491.
Ky. 374.
Ky. 310, 103 S. W. 281.
Ky. 325, 230 S. W. 293.
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ject to such incumbrances or burdens, provided they do not
contravene any rule of law or public policy."
There are two or three cases that seem to call for momentary consideration at this point as they may at first seem to be
at variance with the principles already considered. Rice v.
Ia I 2 4 held that the grantees were bound by a provision requiring them to sell the land conveyed &or a certain sum to a
brother. The decision rests upon the particular facts of the
case and does not come within the doctrine of restraints on
alienation. The deeds in question related to a family settlement
and the consideration for the conveyance was the agreement to
sell for the stipulated price to the brother. In Gillespie v.
Winston's Trustee25 and Sparrow v. Sparrow26 there are dicta
to the effect that "Unquestionably the testatrix had the right
by her will to prohibit absolutely the sale of her property for
any period of time not beyond the limitation placed upon final
alienation and distribution of her estate under section 2360 of
the Kentucky Statutes." That is, that restraints on alienation
will be good if they do not extend beyond lives in being, twenty-one years and ten months. Of course these dicta can no
longer have weight since the court settled the very point involved in the decision of Cammack v. Alle, 27 that section 2360
does not impliedly permit a suspension of alienation for a period shorter than that prescribed.
Furthermore, we need to note in passing what the court
has done when the condition imposing a restraint on alienation
or the enjoyment of the estate conveyed has been violated. As
our subhead denotes a forfeiture is worked. To effect this, however, it will ordinarily be necessary for one who is to profit by
the forfeiture to take some step to make it *effective. In Price
v. Virginia Iron & C. Co.28 the court in dealing with this question used these words: "There being no limitation over, a deed
made in violation of the condition is not void, but voidable,
and the breach may be taken advantage of only by the grantor
or his heirs, who must proceed within the prohibited time. If
no action be taken by the grantor or his heirs during the proS42 S. W. 99, 19 Ky. L. R. 814.
' 170 Ky. 667, 186 S. W. 517.
2a171 Ky. 101, 186 S. W. 904.
199 Ky. 268.
171 Ky. 523, 188 S. W. 658.
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hibited period, the deed made in violation of the condition becomes absolute." In the case before the court parents had conveyed land to their daughter by deed containing a condition that
she could not convey the land to any except bodily heirs of the
grantors for a term of twenty years. She did convey the property during the prohibited time to persons other than the bodily
heirs of the grantors. After the twenty years had elapsed the
heirs of the grantors sought to take advantage of the breach of
the condition. The court held that as no action had been taken
by the grantors or their heirs within the time the deed had become absolute.
Of course, it follows that if the condition against alienation
is void, the limitation over in the event of the first taker shall
29
alien the property is likewise void.
(b)

On Failure to Alienate

It is the law generally in this country that if land is given
to one and his heirs and he is also expressly given power to dispose of the land, a subsequent limitation over in favor of another
person is invalid. This rule is followed in Kentucky. 30 To quote
from the court's opinion in Watkins' Administrator v. Watkins'
Executor,31 "The law is well settled in this state that after a devise of a fee, a limitation over of what is left or undisposed of is
void, as being inconsistent with the fee theretofore granted."
As part of this doctrine it is also held, if the property be given
to one, accompanied by a general or indefinite power of disposition, the estate thus devised is a fee. Thus, if property be
given to one with power to sell or dispose of it, such language
implies a fee; likewise when property is given to one with power
to use and enjoy as he may see fit. In every such case where the
devisee or legatee has the right to dispose of the property at
pleasure, the devise over is inoperative."
As may be seen from the language used by the court in the
" Carpenter v. Allen, 198 Ky. 252.
10McCullough's Admr. v. Anderson, 90 Ky. 126; Clay v. Chenault,
108 Ky. 77; Dulaney v. Dulaney, 25 Ky. L. R. 1659; Becker Iv. Roth, 132
Ky. 429; Fernandez v. Martin, 189 Ky. 438; Linder v. Llewellyn's,
Admr., 190 Ky. 388; Alarrin v. Palmer, 193 Ky. 25; Weller v. Dinwi die, 198 Ky. 360.
=120 S. W. 341.
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foregoing statement, the rule is applied in the case of personal
32
property also.
Where, however, a life estate or interest in the property is
given the first taker, with power of disposition, then the limitation over of such of the devised property as should remain
undisposed of at the death of the life tenant is valid.3 3 In
McCullough's Administrator v. Awderson the court said: "We
think there is a marked distinction between a power given to
one who already has the fee and that given to a life tenant,
who may acquire the fee by the exercise of the power given him.
In the latter instance it is the manifest intention of the testator that the life tenant must acquire the fee in the mode provided by the will, and if the power is not executed, those in remainder take the estate."
In Lancisous v. LouisvillM Trust Co.3 4 the testatrix left
her personal property to her husband "for and during his lifetime" with the power to use and dispose of it "during his
lifetime" "for his support, maintenance, comfort and pleasure."
It was contended that this gave him absolute ownership of the
property. The court, in holding otherwise, said: "It is universally true that a testator may make any disposition of his
property, or attach any condition in his will which is not contrary to public policy or forbidden by law, and we have been
cited to no case holding that it was against public policy, or any
law, to withhold from a donee the power to dispose of the devised property by will, although he may be given all authority
with reference thereto during his life that is possessed by an
absolute owner."
Where, however, an absolute fee was given the first taker,
-with gifts over on his dying intestate or without having bodily
heirs the limitation over, as we have seen, has been held void. In
Cralle v. Jackson25 one paragraph of a will gave testatrix's real
estate wherever located to her daughter, and the next paragraph
provided that if the daughter should die before her husband,
12Fernandez v. Martin, 189 Ky. 438; Parlk v. McACombs, 142 S. W.
401.

,MHCiuough's Adcmr. v. An0erson, 90 Ky. 126; Pedigo's Exor. v.
Botts, 20 Ky. L. R. 196; Woodward v. Anderson, 145 Ky. 134, 140 S.
W. 57; Thurmona v. Thurmond, 190 Ky. 582; Craig v. Roderman, 199
Ky. 105.
201 Ky. 222, 256 S. W. 424.
81 S. W. 669, 26 Ky. L. R. 417.
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without having disposed of the property by will or leaving bodily
heirs, the husband was to take the real estate with power to do
with it as he desired. The court held the limitation over to the
husband was void. In Becker v. Roth3 6 a limitation over of
such property as should remain undisposed of at the time of
the wife's subsequent marriage or at her death was void as being repugnant to the fee given to the wife. The soundness of
this decision, however, is questioned by Tiffany. And in Clay
v. Chenaut 37 the court also held that a gift over after a fee
was ineffective. The testator there provided that if either or
both of his sons should die without children or descendants
then alive "the land of both or either of them in which said
proceeds are invetsed is to revert back and become a part of
my general estate."
Professor Gray took the position that limitations over in
cases like those just cited should be good. He saw no reason
for making an executory devise illegal which depended upon the
first taker's not making a deed or will, if he has the power of
making one should he so wish. 38 The Kentucky decisions on this
point are in harmony with the cases in other American jurisdictions.
(c)

On the Girantee's Insolvency

Another instance of a condition subsequent which may work
a forfeiture of the grantee's estate is one providing that the life
estate or interest shall go over to a third person upon the grantee's becoming bankrupt or upon an attempt of his creditors to
subject the estate or interest to the payment of their claims.
39
Such provisions are held to be valid.
The leading Kentucky decision on this question is Bull v.
Kentucky NationaZ Bank.40 Iii that case a testator devised property to a trustee to pay the rents and profits to his son for life,
but in the event a court of last resort should decide that the income was liable for the son's debts, the rents and profits should
thereafter be paid to the son's wife for her separate use. In an
action by the son's creditors it was decided that the provision
134 Ky. 429, 115 S. W. 761.
108 Ky. 77,; 55 S. W. 729.
Gray, Restraints on Alienation of Property (2nd Ed.), section 57.
' Ibid. section 78.
4090 Ky. 452, 14 S. W. 425, 12 L. R. A. 37.
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was valid and that the creditors -were entitled to the rents only
up to the time of the delivery of the opinion. The court relied
upon the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court case,
41
Niclwlas v. Eaton.
It said: "Counsel seems to have overlooked the fact that
this was the testator's own property he was disposing of, and not
his son's, and argue as if the testator had no power to annex a
condition to the devise that might terminate at once all interest
the son had in the property. It is said there is no authority or
precedent to be followed in this case, but after careful examination of a number of cases we find the right of a testator to make
such a disposition of his estate fully sustained, and have failed,
by reference to the authorities referred to by counsel for the
appellees, to find any single case in which their view of this
question is maintained. Some of the authorities go to the extent
of holding that the interest and dividends of real or personal
property held in trust may be enjoyed by the beneficiary without liability for his debt.
"This court has held the contrary doctrine, but has never
gone so far as to adjudge that the beneficiary might not lose his
estate upon the happening of a contingency provided by the
terms of the trust. A testator cannot vest the title in a trustee
for the use of another, and prevent its enjoyment by the cestui
que irust without subjecting it to the debts of the latter.
"This is the rule in this state, and the doctrine recognized
in this case is not inconsistent with it. While the trustee holds
the property for the use of the debtor, he holds it subject to the
claims of his creditors, but where the property, or its profits,
is to be applied to the use of the beneficiary (the debtor) for a
limited period, or until the happening of a certain event, when
the title or the entire profit is to .vest in another, then the right
of the creditor to subject it for the debt of the first taker is

gone."1
The same result was reached where similar facts were pre43
42
sented in later cases, Bottom v. FUtz, Phlipsv. Big Sandy
44
and Scott v. Ratliff.
In Pkillips v. Big Sandy the court said
"91 U. S. 716.
- 124 Ky. 302, 98 S. W. 1037.
"108 S. W. 276, 32 Ky. L. R. 1262.
179 Ky. 267, 200 S. W. 462.
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the grantee took a fee subject to be defeated by the land being
subjected to his debts.
In City of Louisville v. Cook45 a life estate was devised to
a son on condition that if a judgment was entered against him
subjecting his interest in the property or its use or income for
his debts the estate would cease at the date of the judgment,
though appealed from. A judgment in a suit for taxes was secured against the property. The court, although it regarded the
provision valid, held that the property could be taken to satisfy
the judgment as such a debt would not forfeit the life estate.
The testator intended only debts created by the son should work
a forfeiture.
Finally, in considering the question of forfeiture upon an
involuntary alienation, it must be borne in mind that if there is
no gift over to a third person upon insolvency or attempt of
creditors to reach the interest, the condition is of no effect.
In Brock v. Brock46 such a case was before the court.
There was a devise of land to a daughter with a provision that
the land should not be used to pay the daughter's debts. No
provision, however, was made for a gift over to a third person
upon a creditor's attempt to satisfy his claim out of the property. The court held the condition void as against public policy.
(2)

Restraint on Alienation

Thus far we have considered cases where the grantor or
testator has sought to punish the grantee for alienating the
property by providing that he should forfeit his interest therein
if he should attempt to convey it. We now have to deal with
cases where it has been the purpose of the one devising or deeding the property to make any attempted conveyances void and
thus oblige the holder to keep the property in spite of his own
wishes or those of his creditors. As a general proposition such
provisions are void where the estates created are legal. When
we consider equitable estates we find a difference of opinion.
The earlier Kentucky cases dealing with equitable life estates
are carefully considered by Professor Gray 47 and found to hold
48
such restraints void.
135 Ky. 261, 122 S. W. 144.
168 Ky. 847, 183 See. 215.
47Gray's Restraints on Alienation, 2nd Ed., sections 190a-190b.
" See also Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S. W. 213.
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Section 2355 of the Kentucky Statutes would seem to cover
the question as far as the right of creditors is concerned. It provides that "estates of every kind held or possessed in trust, shall
be subject to the debts and charges of the persons to whose use,
or for whose benefit, they shall be respectively held or possessed,
as they would be subject if those persons owned the like interest
in the property held or possessed as they own or shall own in the
use or trust thereof."
This statute would seem to prevent the creating of a socalled "spendthrift trust" in this state. The nearest approach
to one that we have is to be found in cases like Hackett's Trustees v. Hackett,4 9 Bank of Taylorsvile v. Van Dyke,50 and
Russell v. Meyers.51 In each of these cases devises were made to
a son for life in trust for the support and proper maintenance
during the life of himself and wife and children. Creditors
sought to subject the son's interest to the satisfaction of their
claims. In each case it was held that the trustees had no separable interest that could be taken.
We have next to consider whether the doctrine of Olaflin v.
Clafln.,52 which permits the creation of indestructible trusts
of absolute and indefeasible equitable interests, is the law in this
jurisdiction. In Claflin v. Claflin the Massachusetts court held
that a proviso declarnig that an absolute equitable owner shall
not receive the principal of his gift from the hands of the
trustee until a certain future time beyond the period of the
cestni's minority, is valid. This doctrine is contrary to the practice that prevails in England and many American jurisdictiohs
for if a cestui que trust is the sole beneficiary and is under no
personal disability he may, as a rule, call upon the trustee for
a conveyance of the trust property to him.5 3
Professor Kales in his work on Future Interests"4 suggests
that the rule of Claftin v. Clafin seems to be law in Kentucky
and cites Smith v. Isaacs5 5 and Avery v. Avery "0 in support of
this view. He points out, however, that the postponed enjoy- 146 Ky. 408, 142 S. W. 673.
" 159 Ky. 620, 166 S. W. 1024.
51260 S. W. 377.
2149 Mass. 19.
"1 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd Ed.) 430.
2nd Ed., note 45, section 733.

"78 S. W. 434.
90 Ky. 613.
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ment clause is wholly void if it may possibly last longer than
the period allowed under the rule against perpetuities, but that
it should be remembered that this is not an application of the
rule against perpetuities. Professor Kale's position as to the
law in Kentucky seems correct. Since reasonable restraints on
alienations are allowed in the case of a legal fee simple, it
follows that they will more readily be allowed in the case of
equitable estates.
Smith v. Isaacs seems to be a clear case of upholding a reasonable restraint on alienation. The testator provided that his
children should not have possession of the land devised until
they should reach the age of eighteen years and should not have
the power to alienate or encumber the property until they should
become thirty-five years old. The court upheld the validity of
the restrictions. In Avery v. Avery the testator gave stock to
trustees for the benefit of his son to be held by the trustees until
the son should become twenty-eight years of age, when the trust
should case, provided in the judgment of the trustees the son's
habits rendered it prudent that it should be terminated. On attaining twenty-nine years of age the son brought an action to secure possession of the stock. The court said that if the chancellor should be of the opinion that the necessity for the continuation of the testamentary trust no longer existed, he should
give the cestui que trust possession of the property, otherwise
the trust should continue. A still later case bearing on this
5
" A
question is Miller's Exrs. v. Miller's Heirs and Creditors.
testator directed that his executors should carry on his business
for the benefit of his son until his son should reach the age of
twenty-five years. All the interested parties sought to terminate
the trust before the time provided for in the will. The court
said that "the intention of the testator being plain, the trust
should be executed, and a court has no power to terminate it,
unless it is impossible of accomplishment, or is one of the trusts
belonging to a class which a court may dissolve and terminate
upon the request of the parties to it. . . . Ordinarily a
trust is ended only when the purposes for which it was created
have been accomplished. . . . It is apparent that the objects of the trust in the instant case have not been accomplished.
Furthermore, this is an active trust, and it is manifest that,
- 172 Ky. 519, 189 S. W. 417.
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although the testator had his son Walter in mind as the sole
beneficiary, he intended that the control and management of
the property should be in the hands of the trustees and subject
to their discretion, and hence a court would refuse to terminate
the trust upon his application or that of the trustees."
Only one more question remains for our consideration, namely,
whether funds may be set aside to accumulate for a long period
of time. If the title to the property is not to vest in the beneficiaries until the time for distribution and that time may possibly extend beyond the period fixed in section 2360 of our statutes, the provision will clearly be had as a violation of the rule
against perpetuities. So we find the courts referring to section
2360 whenever a will provides that property shall be allowed to
accumulate for a certain time, and if the period fixed is for a
longer time than a life or lives in being, twenty-one years and
ten months, the court has invariably held the provision void.
In Steven v. Stevens 5s there was a direction in a will that
property be held in trust for forty years and then divided
equally among testator's living children or the issue of his children. This provision was held bad under section 2360. The
court said: "Nor does it matter that the property is to be 'kept
in trust.' A trust for accumulation must be confined within the
limits fixed by the rule against perpetuities; otherwise, both
the direction to accumulate and the gift of the accumulated
fund are void." In Hussey v. Sargent"9 the testator provided
that his property be allowed to accumulate for the benefit of
his grandchildren and directed that "such accumulation and
such income" be "equally divided and paid to and distributed
among" the grandchildren when a designated grandchild should
arrive at the age of thirty-five years, or would have been thirtyfive had he lived. The court held that the gift did not violate
the rule against perpetuities. Then, in Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Lloyd 60 the court held a provision that an estate should not be
sold or encumbered for forty years, at the end of which time it
should be divided, was void under section 2360. Finally, the
most recent case involving the question of accumulations is
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany. 61 The testator ders 54 S. W. 835, 21 Ky. L. R. 1315.
r 116 Ky. 53.
78 Ky. 896, 25 Ky. L. R. 1827.
G202 Ky. 618, 260 S. W. 357.
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vised real estate in trust with the direction that out of the net
income derived therefrom 'the trustees should invest for the
use and benefit of each of the testator's grandchildren living at
the time of his death and for each of those that might be born
within ten years thereafter, the sum of ten dollars a month,
and as each arrived at the age of twenty-two years to pay him
or her the amount so invested, together with the accumulation
thereon. The share of any who should not attain twenty-two
was to go to the others. The court held that the legacies were
contingent, and since they might not vest within the period
fixed by the statute, a life or lives in being, twenty-one years
and ten months, the gifts were void.
It seems clear, then, that any provision for allowing funds
to accumulate where the interest is not vested, will be good,
provided title vests within the time fixed by section 2360. Suppose, however, that the title to the fund be vested. Then the
question would seem to be whether the provision for allowing
the fund to accumulate were a reasonable restraint on the
donee's power to alienate. This being so, a special rule apart
from a statute making the time allowed for accumulations much
shorter than that provided in the rule against perpetuities, is
hardly necessary in Kentucky.
W. LEwIs ROBERTS.
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